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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/9/2015 22:11, Steven D'Aprano
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:20150910021108.GP19373@ando.pearwood.info"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">If the crypto PRNG were comparable in speed to what we have now (not
significantly slower), or faster, <b class="moz-txt-star"><span class="moz-txt-tag">*</span>and<span class="moz-txt-tag">*</span></b> gave reproducible results with
the same seed, <b class="moz-txt-star"><span class="moz-txt-tag">*</span>and<span class="moz-txt-tag">*</span></b> had no known/detectable statistical biases), and we
could promise that those properties would continue to hold even when the
state of the art changed and we got a new default crypto PRNG, then I'd
still be -0.5 on the change due to the "false sense of security" factor.</pre>
</blockquote>
+1 Exactly this. If you can give me the same functionality
(including seeding), make it faster *and* more secure, I have zero
objections. I *still* do not think we should go out of our way to
make random a good source of cryptographic data, since... <br>
<br>
Lets be frank about this, Guido is not a security expert. I am not
a security expert. Tim, I suspect you are not a security expert.
Lets leave actually attempting to be at the cutting edge of
cryptographic randomness to modules by security experts. I have far
too much use for randomness outside of a cryptographic context to
sacrifice the API and feature set we have for, in my opinion, a
myopic focus on one, already discouraged, use of the random module.<br>
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