You don't need a traditional CA for use with TUF or need to worry about a single PKI. TUF is built to be resilient to the compromise of single servers / keys.Typically you would ship the metadata about what keys to trust (TUF's "root metadata") with the software installation tool. This single set of pre-shared metadata means you can securely obtain the rest of the software. (I'm happy to go into more detail, but wanted to avoid this becoming a barrage of TUF details unless everyone is interested.)If you don't want to ship the metadata with the tool, you can also have it work in a trust-on-first-use model. This is what Docker does in their deployment of TUF.
On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 4:40 PM, Wes Turner <wes.turner@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, March 22, 2018, Daniel Holth <dholth@gmail.com> wrote:The feature was a building block that was intended to be used in much the same way that SHA package hashes are used, providing similar security to the ssh-style TOFU model, but less security than other imaginable public key systems. The idea was that it could provide more security in practice because the signatures could exist and be present with the archive, unlike gpg which provides loads of security in theory only. Unfortunately wheel signatures were never built up. I don't think anyone was tricked into believing the primitive provided security on its own.The hashes serve as file integrity check but provide no assurance that they are what the author intended to distribute because there is no cryptographic signature.File hashes help detect bit flips -- due to solar flares -- in storage or transit, but do not mitigate against malicious package modification to packages in storage or transit.AFAIU, TUF (The Update Framework) has a mechanism for limiting which signing keys are valid for which package? Are pre-shared keys then still necessary, or do we then rely on a PKI where one compromised CA cert can then forge any other cert?On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 2:21 PM Nathaniel Smith <njs@pobox.com>ared wrote:Even if no maintenance were required, it's still a feature that promises to provide security but doesn't. This kind of feature has negative value.I'd also suggest adding a small note to the PEP documenting that the signing feature didn't work out, and maybe linking to Donald's package signing blog post. I know updating PEPs isn't the most common thing, but it's the main documentation of the wheel format and it'll save confusion later.______________________________On Mar 22, 2018 10:57 AM, "Wes Turner" <wes.turner@gmail.com> wrote:What maintenance is required?Here's a link to the previous discussion of this issue:"Remove or deprecate wheel-signing features"What has changed? There is still no method for specifying a keyring; whereas with GPG, all keys in the ring are trusted.
On Thursday, March 22, 2018, Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com> wrote:On 22 March 2018 at 22:35, <alex.gronholm@nextday.fi> wrote:Cool, that's what I thought you meant, but I figured I should double check since our discussion was a while ago now :)cryptographic signing and verifying functionality, just the way youI am not changing the format of RECORD, I'm simply removing the
described. Hash checking will stay. As we agreed earlier, those
features could be deprecated or removed from the PEP entirely.Cheers,Nick.
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