I understand your point, and made an attempt at what you're suggesting with my initial post to this mailing list (addressing a different target audience):

"Surviving a Compromise of PyPI" proposes how the Python Package Index (PyPI) can be amended to better protect end users from altered or malicious packages, and to minimize the extent of PyPI compromises against affected users.  The proposed integration allows package managers such as pip to be more secure against various types of security attacks on PyPI and defend end users from attackers responding to package requests. Specifically, these PEPs describe how PyPI processes should be adapted to generate and incorporate repository metadata, which are signed text files that describe the packages and metadata available on PyPI.  Package managers request (along with the packages) the metadata on PyPI to verify the authenticity of packages before they are installed.  The changes to PyPI and tools will be minimal by leveraging a library, The Update Framework, that generates and transparently validates the relevant metadata.

The first stage of the proposal (PEP 458) uses a basic security model that supports verification of PyPI packages signed with cryptographic keys stored on PyPI, requires no action from developers and end users, and protects against malicious CDNs and public mirrors. To support continuous delivery of uploaded packages, PyPI administrators sign for uploaded packages with an online key stored on PyPI infrastructure. This level of security prevents packages from being accidentally or deliberately tampered with by a mirror or a CDN because the mirror or CDN will not have any of the keys required to sign for projects."

Perhaps parts of this introduction (and your suggestion) will work better as an abstract, instead of assuming that the PyPI admins will be the only ones reading PEP 458.

Thanks again for all the feedback.

On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 12:23 PM, Paul Moore <> wrote:
On 2 January 2015 at 16:14, Vladimir Diaz <> wrote:
> There's a lot of background documentation and technical details excluded
> from the PEPs (to avoid turning the PEP into a 15+ page behemoth), but I do
> agree that we should explicitly cover some of these implementation details
> in PEP 458.  Subsections on the exact format of metadata, explanation on how
> metadata is signed, and how the roles are "delegated" with the library,
> still remain.  As Paul as indicated, terminology can also be improved so as
> to be more readable for "non-experts."

There's a tension here, in that while the detail is useful, the
non-expert content needs to be *less* words, not more - the problem is
one of an intimidating wall of text, much more than that the concepts
are difficult. Adding more content, however necessary it is to the
implementation side, probably detracts here.

Just as an example, take the first paragraph of the abstract:

This PEP proposes how the Python Package Index (PyPI [1] ) should be
integrated with The Update Framework [2] (TUF). TUF was designed to be
a flexible security add-on to a software updater or package manager.
The framework integrates best security practices such as separating
role responsibilities, adopting the many-man rule for signing
packages, keeping signing keys offline, and revocation of expired or
compromised signing keys. For example, attackers would have to steal
multiple signing keys stored independently to compromise a role
responsible for specifying a repository's available files. Another
role responsible for indicating the latest snapshot of the repository
may have to be similarly compromised, and independent of the first
compromised role.

There's no way I, even with the benefit of the discussions both on the
list here and off-list, can skim that sentence and get anything more
meaningful than "blah, blah, blah" from it. Taking a moment to think
about it is fine, but at that point you've lost me (in terms of
encouraging me to read the document, rather than just debate based on
what I think it's going to say).

None of the "best security practices" mentioned in sentence 3 mean
anything to me - they all basically look like "do more security stuff"
to me, and "doing security stuff" unfortunately, from my experience,
translates to "jump through annoying hoops that stop me getting my job
done"... Similarly, the last 2 sentences (the example) read as saying
"attackers have to work harder". Well good, I'd sort of hope the PEP
provided a benefit of some sort :-)

The following (somewhat off the cuff) may work better:

This PEP proposes some changes to the Python Package Index (PyPI)
infrastructure to enhance its resistance to attack without requiring
any changes in workflow from project authors. It is similar to recent
changes to use TLS for all PyPI traffic, but offers additional
security over TLS. Future PEPs may look at further security
enhancements that could require additional action from project
authors, but this PEP is restricted to the PyPI infrastructure and
mirroring software.

Sorry for what is pretty much a hatchet job on a single paragraph take
out of context from the PEP, but hopefully you can see what I'm trying
to say - skip details of security concepts, attack vectors, etc, and
concentrate on "we're making things better - it's as low impact as the
change to TLS - project authors won't need to do anything (at this
stage)". Those are the key messages to get across straight away. A few
more paragraphs in the abstract explaining in non-technical terms
what's being done and why, and you're done. You can say "the rest of
the document is the technical details for people with an understanding
of (or interest in) the security concepts" and get on with the

If you can get the non-specialists to read just the abstract section,
and go away knowing they are happy to let the expects get on with the
process, you've won. Put the details and the scary terms in the "for
experts and interested parties only" main body.