On Sun, 2014-05-11 at 18:28 +0900, Stephen J. Turnbull wrote:
Legitimizing the ESPs does bother me, but that wasn't my point, and I think it probably wasn't John's either. My point was that anything that makes it appear that a message whose DKIM signature doesn't verify is actually from the user assigned that address can be emulated by spammers. That will cause these same ESPs to try to prevent that from happening, and the cycle starts again.
That's true, but what I suggested is, or should be simpler than that, and is fundamentally no different from what Mailman does now with wrapping. The points are:
implementation of a MIME multipart standard _specifically_ for the purpose of wrapping emails would be a good idea. The result would be not so much the visual elimination of information from a message but a standardization of MUA presentation so as to avoid putting off non-tech people. No effort need be made to make a message appear that it's something that it's not, or to disguise the presence or absence of DKIM verification.
the observation that such encapsulation, and a uniform way of handling and presenting it, may be a way forward if ANY methods of sender authentication become widespread, which IMHO is likely. If the industry requires standards and the IETF standards process doesn't keep up, the result is, and always has been, fragmented standards (a.k.a. no standards). Case in point: the non-standardization of HTML enhancement for email.
The MUA authors (at least the MUAs I use ;-) will catch up by the way. Some already do, actually.
I would guess that Xemacs VM isn't for the technologically faint of heart ;)
-- Lindsay Haisley | "Everything works if you let it" FMP Computer Services | 512-259-1190 | - The Roadie http://www.fmp.com |