[Tim, quoting Ping]> The following images visually demonstrate how Plurality penalizes centrist

> candidates and Borda favours them; how Approval and Condorcet yield nearly
> identical results; and how the Hare method yields extremely strange
> behaviour. ...

[Steven D'Aprano][

Why am I not surprised that here in Australia, we use IRV for our House
of Representatives and most state governments?

This is getting off-topic, so I'll stop with this: the push for iRV in the United States is mostly by 3rd parties who are essentially wholly locked out of any chance of winning under our plurality "winner takes all" voting systems.

But, while Ping's page doesn't address this, there are good arguments on the rangevoting site for why IRV is just as likely to ensure 2-party dominance. Which historical evidence appears to support. Indeed, on an Australian government web page I can't find right now, it explicitly said that your version of IRV favored 2-party dominance too.

But that's not really relevant here until we form pro-Inquisition and anti-Inquisition parties (which, over time, will come to support the opposites of their names say) :-)