On 2 Sep 2014 03:08, "Donald Stufft" email@example.com wrote:
On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:01 PM, Christian Heimes firstname.lastname@example.org
On 01.09.2014 17:35, Nick Coghlan wrote:
Oh, now I get what you mean - yes, sitecustomize already poses the same kind of problem as the proposed sslcustomize (hence the existence of the related command line options).
If an attacker is able to place a module like sitecustomize.py in an import directory or any .pth file in a site-packages directory than this Python installation is compromised. .pth files are insidious because they are always loaded and their code is always executed. I don't see how sslcustomize is going to make a difference here.
Right, this is the point I was trying to make. If you’ve installed a
package it’s game over. There’s nothing Python can do to help you.
Yes, that's what I said originally when pointing out that isolated mode and the switch to disable site module processing would need to disable sslcustomize processing as well.
Antoine was replying to a side comment about it being tricky to shadow stdlib modules. I left out the qualifier "directly" in my original comment, and he left out "indirectly through sitecustomize" in his initial reply, so we were talking past each for a while.
Donald Stufft PGP: 7C6B 7C5D 5E2B 6356 A926 F04F 6E3C BCE9 3372 DCFA