On 2 Sep 2014 03:08, "Donald Stufft" <donald@stufft.io> wrote:
>> On Sep 1, 2014, at 1:01 PM, Christian Heimes <christian@python.org> wrote:
>> On 01.09.2014 17:35, Nick Coghlan wrote:
>>> Oh, now I get what you mean - yes, sitecustomize already poses the same
>>> kind of problem as the proposed sslcustomize (hence the existence of the
>>> related command line options).
>> If an attacker is able to place a module like sitecustomize.py in an
>> import directory or any .pth file in a site-packages directory than this
>> Python installation is compromised. .pth files are insidious because
>> they are always loaded and their code is always executed. I don't see
>> how sslcustomize is going to make a difference here.
> Right, this is the point I was trying to make. If you’ve installed a malicious
> package it’s game over. There’s nothing Python can do to help you.

Yes, that's what I said originally when pointing out that isolated mode and the switch to disable site module processing would need to disable sslcustomize processing as well.

Antoine was replying to a side comment about it being tricky to shadow stdlib modules. I left out the qualifier "directly" in my original comment, and he left out "indirectly through sitecustomize" in his initial reply, so we were talking past each for a while.


> ---
> Donald Stufft
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