At the same time, we need to account for the fact that most existing
organisations still trust in perimeter defence for their internal
network security, and hence tolerate (or even actively encourage) the
use of unsecured connections, or skipping certificate validation,
internally. This is actually a really terrible idea, but it's still
incredibly common due to the general failure of the technology
industry to take usability issues seriously when we design security
systems (at least until recently) - doing the wrong "unsafe" thing is
genuinely easier than doing things right.
Just a quick clarification in order to be a little clearer, this change will
(obviously) only effect those who trust perimeter security *and* decided to
install an invalid certificate instead of just using HTTP. I'm not saying that
this doesn't happen, just being specific (I'm not actually sure why they would
install a TLS certificate at all if they are trusting perimeter security, but
I'm sure folks do).
PGP: 7C6B 7C5D 5E2B 6356 A926 F04F 6E3C BCE9 3372 DCFA