PEP 466 (round 5): selected network security enhancements for Python 2.7
Guido and Antoine persuaded me that selective backports would be a better idea for the network security enhancements than the wholesale module backports previously suggested, while Alex and Donald provided the necessary additional details, so here's a revised version of the PEP. Despite making it more explicit, I deleted more lines than I added, strongly suggesting that switching to selective backports was the right call :) I dealt with the SSL module the way Donald suggested: excluding the RAND_* functions, rather than listing everything else. I also changed the headings to make it clear the listed alternatives were rejected ideas, made the footnotes a bit more readable, and tidied up the wording in a few places. Diff: http://hg.python.org/peps/rev/8527f6e2beb0 Web: http://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0466/ ========================== PEP: 466 Title: Network Security Enhancement Exception for Python 2.7 Version: $Revision$ Last-Modified: $Date$ Author: Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com>, Status: Draft Type: Informational Content-Type: text/x-rst Created: 23-Mar-2014 Post-History: 23-Mar-2014, 24-Mar-2014, 25-Mar-2014, 26-Mar-2014 Abstract ======== Most CPython tracker issues are classified as errors in behaviour or proposed enhancements. Most patches to fix behavioural errors are applied to all active maintenance branches. Enhancement patches are restricted to the default branch that becomes the next Python version. This cadence works reasonably well during Python's normal 18-24 month feature release cycle, which is still applicable to the Python 3 series. However, the age of the standard library in Python 2 has now reached a point where it is sufficiently far behind the state of the art in network security protocols for it to be causing real problems in use cases where upgrading to Python 3 in the near term may not be feasible. In recognition of the additional practical considerations that have arisen during the 4+ year maintenance cycle for Python 2.7, this PEP allows Python 2.7 standard library components that have implications for the overall security of the internet to be updated in line with the corresponding Python 3 feature releases. Specifically, the exception allows a critical set of network security related features to be backported from Python 3.4 to the upcoming Python 2.7.7 maintenance release. While this PEP does not make any changes to the core development team's handling of security-fix-only branches that are no longer in active maintenance, it *does* recommend that commercial redistributors providing extended support periods for the Python standard library either backport these features to their supported versions, or else explicitly disclaim support for the use of older versions in roles that involve connecting directly to the public internet. Exemption Policy ================ Under this policy, the following features SHOULD be backported from Python 3.4 to the upcoming Python 2.7.7 maintenance release: * in the ``os`` module: * persistent file descriptor for ``os.urandom()``. * in the ``hmac`` module: * constant time comparison function (``hmac.compare_digest()``). * in the ``hashlib`` module: * password hashing function (``hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac()``). * details of hash algorithm availability (``hashlib.algorithms_guaranteed`` and ``hashlib.algorithms_guaranteed``). * in the ``ssl`` module: * this module is almost entirely synchronised with its Python 3 counterpart, bringing TLSv2, SSLContext manipulation, Server Name Identification, access to platform certificate stores, standard library support for peer hostname validation and more to the Python 2 series. * the only ``ssl`` module features *not* backported under this policy are the ``ssl.RAND_*`` functions that provide access to OpenSSL's random number generation capabilities - use ``os.urandom()`` instead. As part of this policy, permission is also granted to upgrade to newer feature releases of OpenSSL when preparing the binary installers for new maintenance releases of Python 2.7. Backwards Compatibility Considerations ====================================== As in the Python 3 series, the backported ``ssl.create_default_context()`` API is granted a backwards compatibility exemption that permits the protocol, options, cipher and other settings of the created SSL context to be made This PEP does *not* grant any exemptions to the usual backwards compatibility policy for maintenance releases. Instead, by explicitly encouraging the use of feature based checks, it is designed to make it easier to write more secure cross-version compatible Python software, while still limiting the risk of breaking currently working software when upgrading to a new Python 2.7 maintenance release. In all cases where this policy allows new features to be backported to the Python 2.7 release series, it is possible to write cross-version compatible code that operates by "feature detection" (for example, checking for particular attributes in a module), without needing to explicitly check the Python version. It is then up to library and framework code to provide an appropriate warning and fallback behaviour if a desired feature is found to be missing. While some especially security sensitive software MAY fail outright if a desired security feature is unavailable, most software SHOULD instead emit a warning and continue operating using a slightly degraded security configuration. The backported APIs allow library and application code to perform the following actions after detecting the presence of a relevant network security related feature: * explicitly opt in to more secure settings (to allow the use of enhanced security features in older maintenance releases of Python with less secure default behaviour) * explicitly opt in to less secure settings (to allow the use of newer Python feature releases in lower security environments) * determine the default setting for the feature (this MAY require explicit Python version checks to determine the Python feature release, but DOES NOT require checking for a specific maintenance release) Security related changes to other modules (such as higher level networking libraries and data format processing libraries) will continue to be made available as backports and new modules on the Python Package Index, as independent distribution remains the preferred approach to handling software that must continue to evolve to handle changing development requirements independently of the Python 2 standard library. Refer to the `Motivation and Rationale`_ section for a review of the characteristics that make the secure networking infrastructure worthy of special consideration. OpenSSL compatibility --------------------- Under this policy, OpenSSL may be upgraded to more recent feature releases in Python 2.7 maintenance releases. On Linux and most other POSIX systems, the specific version of OpenSSL used already varies, as CPython dynamically links to the system provided OpenSSL library by default. For the Windows binary installers, the ``_ssl`` and ``_hashlib`` modules are statically linked with OpenSSL and the associated symbols are not exported. Marc-Andre Lemburg indicates that updating to newer OpenSSL releases in the ``egenix-pyopenssl`` binaries has not resulted in any reported compatibility issues [3]_ The Mac OS X binary installers historically followed the same policy as other POSIX installations and dynamically linked to the Apple provided OpenSSL libraries. However, Apple has now ceased updating these cross-platform libraries, instead requiring that even cross-platform developers adopt Mac OS X specific interfaces to access up to date security infrastructure on their platform. Accordingly, and independently of this PEP, the Mac OS X binary installers were already going to be switched to statically linker newer versions of OpenSSL [4]_ Other Considerations ==================== Maintainability --------------- This policy does NOT represent a commitment by volunteer contributors to actually backport network security related changes from the Python 3 series to the Python 2 series. Rather, it is intended to send a clear signal to potential corporate contributors that the core development team are willing to accept offers of corporate assistance in putting this policy into effect and handling the resulting increase in the Python 2 maintenance load. Backporting security related fixes and enhancements to earlier versions is a common service for commercial redistributors to offer to their customers. This policy represents an explicit invitation to implement those changes in the core development tree in cases where they are likely to have a broad impact that helps improve the security of the internet as a whole, with the assurance that the existing core development team not only won't object to such contributions, but will actively encourage their incorporation into the next Python 2.7 maintenance release. Documentation ------------- All modules covered by this policy MUST include a "Security Considerations" section in their documentation in order to take advantage of this policy. In addition to any other module specific contents, this section SHOULD enumerate key security enhancements and fixes (with CVE identifiers where applicable), along with the feature and maintenance releases that first included them. Security releases ----------------- This PEP does not propose any changes to the handling of security releases - those will continue to be source only releases that include only critical security fixes. However, the recommendations for library and application developers are deliberately designed to accommodate commercial redistributors that choose to apply this policy to additional Python release series that are either in security fix only mode, or have been declared "end of life" by the core development team. Whether or not redistributors choose to exercise that option will be up to the individual redistributor. Integration testing ------------------- Third party integration testing services should offer users the ability to test against specific Python 2.7 maintenance releases, to ensure that libraries, frameworks and applications can still test their handling of the legacy security infrastructure correctly (either failing or degrading gracefully, depending on the security sensitivity of the software), even after the features covered in this policy have been backported to the Python 2.7 series. Handling lower security environments with low risk tolerance ------------------------------------------------------------ For better or for worse (mostly worse), there are some environments where the risk of latent security defects is more tolerated than even a slightly increased risk of regressions in maintenance releases. This policy largely excludes these environments from consideration where the modules covered by the exemption are concerned - this approach is entirely inappropriate for software connected to the public internet, and defence in depth security principles suggest that it is not appropriate for most private networks either. Downstream redistributors may still choose to cater to such environments, but they will need to handle the process of downgrading the security related modules and doing the associated regression testing themselves. The main CPython continuous integration infrastructure will not cover this scenario. Evolution of this Policy ======================== The key requirement for a feature to be considered for inclusion in this policy is that it must have security implications *beyond* the specific application that is written in Python and the system that application is running on. Thus the focus on network security protocols, password storage and related cryptographic infrastructure - Python is a popular choice for the development of web services and clients, and thus the capabilities of widely used Python versions have implications for the security design of other services that may themselves be using newer versions of Python or other development languages, but need to interoperate with clients or servers written using older versions of Python. The intent behind this requirement is to minimise any impact that the introduction of this policy may have on the stability and compatibility of maintenance releases. It would be thoroughly counterproductive if end users became as cautious about updating to new Python 2.7 maintenance releases as they are about updating to new feature releases within the same release series. Motivation and Rationale ======================== The creation of this PEP was prompted primarily by the aging SSL support in the Python 2 series. As of March 2014, the Python 2.7 SSL module is approaching four years of age, and the SSL support in the still popular Python 2.6 release had its feature set locked six years ago. These are simply too old to provide a foundation that can be recommended in good conscience for secure networking software that operates over the public internet, especially in an era where it is becoming quite clearly evident that advanced persistent security threats are even more widespread and more indiscriminate in their targeting than had previously been understood. While they represented reasonable security infrastructure in their time, the state of the art has moved on, and we need to investigate mechanisms for effectively providing more up to date network security infrastructure for users that, for whatever reason, are not currently in a position to migrate to Python 3. While the use of the system OpenSSL installation addresses many of these concerns on Linux platforms, it doesn't address all of them (in particular, it is still difficult for sotware to explicitly require some higher level security settings). In the case of the binary installers for Windows and Mac OS X that are published on python.org, the version of OpenSSL used is entirely within the control of the Python core development team, but is currently limited to OpenSSL maintenance releases for the version initially shipped with the corresponding Python feature release. With increased popularity comes increased responsibility, and this policy aims to acknowledge the fact that Python's popularity and adoption is at a sufficiently high level that some of our design and policy decisions have significant implications beyond the Python development community. As one example, the Python 2 ``ssl`` module does not support the Server Name Identification standard. While it is possible to obtain SNI support by using the third party ``requests`` client library, actually doing so currently requires using not only ``requests`` and its embedded dependencies, but also half a dozen or more additional libraries. The lack of support in the Python 2 series thus serves as an impediment to making effective use of SNI on servers, as Python 2 clients will frequently fail to handle it correctly. Another more critical example is the lack of SSL hostname matching in the Python 2 standard library - it is currently necessary to rely on a third party library, such as ``requests`` or ``backports.ssl_match_hostname`` to obtain that functionality in Python 2. The Python 2 series also remains more vulnerable to remote timing attacks on security sensitive comparisons than the Python 3 series, as it lacks a standard library equivalent to the timing attack resistant ``hmac.compare_digest()`` function. While appropriate secure comparison functions can be implemented in third party extensions, many users don't even consider the issue and use ordinary equality comparisons instead - while a standard library solution doesn't automatically fix that problem, it *does* make the barrier to resolution much lower once the problem is pointed out. My position on the ongoing transition from Python 2 to Python 3 has long been that Python 2 remains a supported platform for the core development team, and that commercial support will remain available well after upstream maintenance ends. However, in the absence of this network security enhancement policy, that position is difficult to justify when it comes to software that operates over the public internet. Just as many developers consider it too difficult to develop truly secure modern networked software in C/C++ (largely due to the challenges associated with manual memory management), I anticipate that in the not too distant future, it will be considered too difficult to develop truly secure modern networked software using the Python 2 series (some developers would argue that we have already reached that point). Python 2.7 represents the only long term maintenance release the core development team has provided, and it is natural that there will be things that worked over a historically shorter maintenance lifespan that don't work over this longer support period. In the specific case of the problem described in this PEP, the simplest available solution is to acknowledge that long term maintenance of network security related modules *requires* the ability to add new features, even while retaining backwards compatibility for existing interfaces. It is worth comparing the approach described in this PEP with Red Hat's handling of its long term support commitments: it isn't the RHEL 6.0 release itself that receives 10 years worth of support, but the overall RHEL 6 *series*. The individual RHEL 6.x point releases within the series then receive a wide variety of new features, including security enhancements, all while meeting strict backwards compatibility guarantees for existing software. The policy described in this PEP brings our approach to long term maintenance more into line with this precedent - we retain our strict backwards compatibility requirements, but slightly relax the restrictions against adding new features. To date, downstream redistributors have respected our upstream policy of "no new features in Python maintenance releases". This PEP explicitly accepts that a more nuanced policy is appropriate in the case of network security related features, and the specific one it describes is deliberately designed such that it at least has some chance of being applied to Red Hat Enterprise Linux and its downstream derivatives. Rejected alternative: just advise developers to migrate to Python 3 ------------------------------------------------------------------- This alternative represents the status quo. Unfortunately, it has proven to be unworkable in practice, as the backwards compatibility implications mean that this is a non-trivial migration process for large applications and integration projects. While the tools for migration have evolved to a point where it is possible to migrate even large applications opportunistically and incrementally (rather than all at once) by updating code to run in the large common subset of Python 2 and Python 3, using the most recent technology often isn't a priority in commercial environments. Previously, this was considered an acceptable harm, as while it was an unfortunate problem for the affected developers to have to face, it was seen as an issue between them and their management chain to make the case for infrastructure modernisation, and this case would become naturally more compelling as the Python 3 series evolved. However, now that we're fully aware of the impact the limitations of the Python 2 standard library may be having on the evolution of internet security standards, I no longer believe that it is reasonable to expect platform and application developers to resolve all of the latent defects in an application's Unicode correctness solely in order to gain access to the network security enhancements already available in Python 3. While Ubuntu (and to some extent Debian as well) are committed to porting all default system services and scripts to Python 3, and to removing Python 2 from its default distribution images (but not from its archives), this is a mammoth task and won't be completed for the Ubuntu 14.04 LTS release (at least for the desktop image - it may be achieved for the mobile and server images). Fedora has even more work to do to migrate, and it will take a non-trivial amount of time to migrate the relevant infrastructure components. While Red Hat are also actively working to make it easier for users to use more recent versions of Python on our stable platforms, it's going to take time for those efforts to start having an impact on end users' choice of version, and any such changes also don't benefit the core platform infrastructure that runs in the integrated system Python by necessity. The OpenStack migration to Python 3 is also still in its infancy, and even though that's a project with an extensive and relatively robust automated test suite, it's still large enough that it is going to take quite some time to migrate fully to a Python 2/3 compatible code base. And that's just three of the highest profile open source projects that make heavy use of Python. Given the likely existence of large amounts of legacy code that lacks the kind of automated regression test suite needed to help support a migration from Python 2 to Python 3, there are likely to be many cases where reimplementation (perhaps even in Python 3) proves easier than migration. The key point of this PEP is that those situations affect more people than just the developers and users of the affected application: the existence of clients and servers with outdated network security infrastructure becomes something that developers of secure networked services need to take into account as part of their security design, and that's a problem that inhibits the adoption of better security standards. As Terry Reedy noted, if we try to persist with the status quo, the likely outcome is that commercial redistributors will attempt to do something like this on behalf of their customers *anyway*, but in a potentially inconsistent and ad hoc manner. By drawing the scope definition process into the upstream project we are in a better position to influence the approach taken to address the situation and to help ensure some consistency across redistributors. The problem is real, so *something* needs to change, and this PEP describes my preferred approach to addressing the situation. Rejected alternative: create and release Python 2.8 --------------------------------------------------- With sufficient corporate support, it likely *would* be possible to create and release Python 2.8 (it's highly unlikely such a project would garner enough interest to be achievable with only volunteers). However, this wouldn't actually solve the problem, as the aim is to provide a *relatively low impact* way to incorporate enhanced security features into integrated products and deployments that make use of Python 2. Upgrading to a new Python feature release would mean both more work for the core development team, as well as a more disruptive update that most potential end users would likely just skip entirely. Attempting to create a Python 2.8 release would also bring in suggestions to backport many additional features from Python 3 (such as ``tracemalloc`` and the improved coroutine support), making the migration from Python 2.7 to this hypothetical 2.8 release even riskier and more disruptive. This is not a recommended approach, as it would involve substantial additional work for a result that is actually less effective in achieving the original aim (which is to eliminate the current widespread use of the aging network security infrastructure in the Python 2 series). Furthermore, while I can't make any commitments to actually addressing this issue on Red Hat platforms, I *can* categorically rule out the idea of a Python 2.8 being of any use to me in even attempting to get it addressed. Rejected alternative: distribute the security enhancements via PyPI ------------------------------------------------------------------- While this initially appears to be an attractive and easier to manage approach, it actually suffers from several significant problems. Firstly, this is complex, low level, cross-platform code that integrates with the underlying operating system across a variety of POSIX platforms (including Mac OS X) and Windows. The CPython BuildBot fleet is already set up to handle continuous integration in that context, but most of the freely available continuous integration services just offer Linux, and perhaps paid access to Windows. Those services work reasonably well for software that largely runs on the abstraction layers offered by Python and other dynamic languages, as well as the more comprehensive abstraction offered by the JVM, but won't suffice for the kind of code involved here. The OpenSSL dependency for the network security support also qualifies as the kind of "complex binary dependency" that isn't yet handled well by the ``pip`` based software distribution ecosystem. Relying on a third party binary dependency also creates potential compatibility problems for ``pip`` when running on other interpreters like ``PyPy``. Another practical problem with the idea is the fact that ``pip`` itself relies on the ``ssl`` support in the standard library (with some additional support from a bundled copy of ``requests``, which in turn bundles ``backport.ssl_match_hostname``), and hence would require any replacement module to also be bundled within ``pip``. This wouldn't pose any insurmountable difficulties (it's just another dependency to vendor), but it *would* mean yet another copy of OpenSSL to keep up to date. This approach also has the same flaw as all other "improve security by renaming things" approaches: they completely miss the users who most need help, and raise significant barriers against being able to encourage users to do the right thing when their infrastructure supports it (since "use this other module" is a much higher impact change than "turn on this higher security setting"). Deprecating the aging SSL infrastructure in the standard library in favour of an external module would be even more user hostile than accepting the slightly increased risk of regressions associated with upgrading it in place. Last, but certainly not least, this approach suffers from the same problem as the idea of doing a Python 2.8 release: likely not solving the actual problem. Commercial redistributors of Python are set up to redistribute *Python*, and a pre-existing set of additional packages. Getting new packages added to the pre-existing set *can* be done, but means approaching each and every redistributor and asking them to update their repackaging process accordingly. By contrast, the approach described in this PEP would require redistributors to deliberately *opt out* of the security enhancements by deliberately downgrading the provided network security infrastructure, which most of them are unlikely to do. Rejected variant: provide a "legacy SSL infrastructure" branch -------------------------------------------------------------- Earlier versions of this PEP included the concept of a ``2.7-legacy-ssl`` branch that preserved the exact feature set of the Python 2.7.6 network security infrastructure. It is the opinion of the PEP author that anyone that actually wants this is almost certainly making a mistake, and if they insist they really do want it in their specific situation, they're welcome to either make it themselves or arrange for a downstream redistributor to make it for them. If they are made publicly available, any such rebuilds should be referred to as "Python 2.7 with Legacy SSL" to clearly distinguish them from the official Python 2.7 releases that include more up to date network security infrastructure. After the first Python 2.7 maintenance release that has the security infrastructure updated to match Python 3.4, it would also be appropriate to refer to Python 2.7.6 and earlier releases as "Python 2.7 with Legacy SSL". Rejected variant: synchronise particular modules entirely with Python 3 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Earlier versions of this PEP suggested synchronising the ``hmac``, ``hashlib`` and ``ssl`` modules entirely with their Python 3 counterparts. This approach proved too vague to build a compelling case for the exception, and has thus been replaced by the current more explicit proposal. Open Questions ============== * MvL has indicated he is not prepared to tackle the task of trying to integrate a newer OpenSSL into the also aging Python 2.7 build infrastructure on Windows (unfortunately, we've looked into upgrading that build infrastructure, and the backwards compatibility issues appear to be effectively insurmountable). We would require a commitment from another trusted contributor to handle at least this task, and potentially also taking over the task of creating the official Python 2.7 Windows installers for the remaining Python 2.7 maintenance releases. * We would need commitments to create and review full backports of the components covered by this policy from Python 3.4 to Python 2.7, as well as support for handling any more specific security issues affecting these modules. * Did I miss anything important in the switch to a more restrictive proposal? Disclosure of Interest ====================== The author of this PEP currently works for Red Hat on test automation tools. If this proposal is accepted, I will be strongly encouraging Red Hat to take advantage of the resulting opportunity to help improve the overall security of the Python ecosystem. However, I do not speak for Red Hat in this matter, and cannot make any commitments on Red Hat's behalf. Acknowledgements ================ Thanks to Christian Heimes and other for their efforts in greatly improving Python's SSL support in the Python 3 series, and a variety of members of the Python community for helping me to better understand the implications of the default settings we provide in our SSL modules, and the impact that tolerating the use of SSL infrastructure that was defined in 2010 (Python 2.7) or even 2008 (Python 2.6) potentially has for the security of the web as a whole. Thanks to Donald Stufft and Alex Gaynor for identifying a more limited set of essential security features that allowed the proposal to be made more fine-grained than backporting entire modules from Python 3.4 [7,8]_. Christian and Donald also provided valuable feedback on a preliminary draft of this proposal. Thanks also to participants in the python-dev mailing list threads [1,2,5,6]_ References ========== .. [1] PEP 466 discussion (round 1) (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133334.html) .. [2] PEP 466 discussion (round 2) (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133389.html) .. [3] Marc-Andre Lemburg's OpenSSL feedback for Windows (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133438.html) .. [4] Ned Deily's OpenSSL feedback for Mac OS X (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133347.html) .. [5] PEP 466 discussion (round 3) (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133442.html) .. [6] PEP 466 discussion (round 4) (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133472.html) .. [7] Donald Stufft's recommended set of backported features (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133500.html) .. [8] Alex Gaynor's recommended set of backported features (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133503.html) Copyright ========= This document has been placed in the public domain. -- Nick Coghlan | ncoghlan@gmail.com | Brisbane, Australia
Typo I think: As in the Python 3 series, the backported ssl.create_default_context() API is granted a backwards compatibility exemption that permits the protocol, options, cipher and other settings of the created SSL context to be made made what? On Mar 26, 2014, at 8:00 AM, Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com> wrote:
Guido and Antoine persuaded me that selective backports would be a better idea for the network security enhancements than the wholesale module backports previously suggested, while Alex and Donald provided the necessary additional details, so here's a revised version of the PEP. Despite making it more explicit, I deleted more lines than I added, strongly suggesting that switching to selective backports was the right call :)
I dealt with the SSL module the way Donald suggested: excluding the RAND_* functions, rather than listing everything else.
I also changed the headings to make it clear the listed alternatives were rejected ideas, made the footnotes a bit more readable, and tidied up the wording in a few places.
Diff: http://hg.python.org/peps/rev/8527f6e2beb0 Web: http://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0466/
========================== PEP: 466 Title: Network Security Enhancement Exception for Python 2.7 Version: $Revision$ Last-Modified: $Date$ Author: Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com>, Status: Draft Type: Informational Content-Type: text/x-rst Created: 23-Mar-2014 Post-History: 23-Mar-2014, 24-Mar-2014, 25-Mar-2014, 26-Mar-2014
Abstract ========
Most CPython tracker issues are classified as errors in behaviour or proposed enhancements. Most patches to fix behavioural errors are applied to all active maintenance branches. Enhancement patches are restricted to the default branch that becomes the next Python version.
This cadence works reasonably well during Python's normal 18-24 month feature release cycle, which is still applicable to the Python 3 series. However, the age of the standard library in Python 2 has now reached a point where it is sufficiently far behind the state of the art in network security protocols for it to be causing real problems in use cases where upgrading to Python 3 in the near term may not be feasible.
In recognition of the additional practical considerations that have arisen during the 4+ year maintenance cycle for Python 2.7, this PEP allows Python 2.7 standard library components that have implications for the overall security of the internet to be updated in line with the corresponding Python 3 feature releases.
Specifically, the exception allows a critical set of network security related features to be backported from Python 3.4 to the upcoming Python 2.7.7 maintenance release.
While this PEP does not make any changes to the core development team's handling of security-fix-only branches that are no longer in active maintenance, it *does* recommend that commercial redistributors providing extended support periods for the Python standard library either backport these features to their supported versions, or else explicitly disclaim support for the use of older versions in roles that involve connecting directly to the public internet.
Exemption Policy ================
Under this policy, the following features SHOULD be backported from Python 3.4 to the upcoming Python 2.7.7 maintenance release:
* in the ``os`` module:
* persistent file descriptor for ``os.urandom()``.
* in the ``hmac`` module:
* constant time comparison function (``hmac.compare_digest()``).
* in the ``hashlib`` module:
* password hashing function (``hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac()``). * details of hash algorithm availability (``hashlib.algorithms_guaranteed`` and ``hashlib.algorithms_guaranteed``).
* in the ``ssl`` module:
* this module is almost entirely synchronised with its Python 3 counterpart, bringing TLSv2, SSLContext manipulation, Server Name Identification, access to platform certificate stores, standard library support for peer hostname validation and more to the Python 2 series. * the only ``ssl`` module features *not* backported under this policy are the ``ssl.RAND_*`` functions that provide access to OpenSSL's random number generation capabilities - use ``os.urandom()`` instead.
As part of this policy, permission is also granted to upgrade to newer feature releases of OpenSSL when preparing the binary installers for new maintenance releases of Python 2.7.
Backwards Compatibility Considerations ======================================
As in the Python 3 series, the backported ``ssl.create_default_context()`` API is granted a backwards compatibility exemption that permits the protocol, options, cipher and other settings of the created SSL context to be made
This PEP does *not* grant any exemptions to the usual backwards compatibility policy for maintenance releases. Instead, by explicitly encouraging the use of feature based checks, it is designed to make it easier to write more secure cross-version compatible Python software, while still limiting the risk of breaking currently working software when upgrading to a new Python 2.7 maintenance release.
In all cases where this policy allows new features to be backported to the Python 2.7 release series, it is possible to write cross-version compatible code that operates by "feature detection" (for example, checking for particular attributes in a module), without needing to explicitly check the Python version.
It is then up to library and framework code to provide an appropriate warning and fallback behaviour if a desired feature is found to be missing. While some especially security sensitive software MAY fail outright if a desired security feature is unavailable, most software SHOULD instead emit a warning and continue operating using a slightly degraded security configuration.
The backported APIs allow library and application code to perform the following actions after detecting the presence of a relevant network security related feature:
* explicitly opt in to more secure settings (to allow the use of enhanced security features in older maintenance releases of Python with less secure default behaviour) * explicitly opt in to less secure settings (to allow the use of newer Python feature releases in lower security environments) * determine the default setting for the feature (this MAY require explicit Python version checks to determine the Python feature release, but DOES NOT require checking for a specific maintenance release)
Security related changes to other modules (such as higher level networking libraries and data format processing libraries) will continue to be made available as backports and new modules on the Python Package Index, as independent distribution remains the preferred approach to handling software that must continue to evolve to handle changing development requirements independently of the Python 2 standard library. Refer to the `Motivation and Rationale`_ section for a review of the characteristics that make the secure networking infrastructure worthy of special consideration.
OpenSSL compatibility ---------------------
Under this policy, OpenSSL may be upgraded to more recent feature releases in Python 2.7 maintenance releases. On Linux and most other POSIX systems, the specific version of OpenSSL used already varies, as CPython dynamically links to the system provided OpenSSL library by default.
For the Windows binary installers, the ``_ssl`` and ``_hashlib`` modules are statically linked with OpenSSL and the associated symbols are not exported. Marc-Andre Lemburg indicates that updating to newer OpenSSL releases in the ``egenix-pyopenssl`` binaries has not resulted in any reported compatibility issues [3]_
The Mac OS X binary installers historically followed the same policy as other POSIX installations and dynamically linked to the Apple provided OpenSSL libraries. However, Apple has now ceased updating these cross-platform libraries, instead requiring that even cross-platform developers adopt Mac OS X specific interfaces to access up to date security infrastructure on their platform. Accordingly, and independently of this PEP, the Mac OS X binary installers were already going to be switched to statically linker newer versions of OpenSSL [4]_
Other Considerations ====================
Maintainability ---------------
This policy does NOT represent a commitment by volunteer contributors to actually backport network security related changes from the Python 3 series to the Python 2 series. Rather, it is intended to send a clear signal to potential corporate contributors that the core development team are willing to accept offers of corporate assistance in putting this policy into effect and handling the resulting increase in the Python 2 maintenance load.
Backporting security related fixes and enhancements to earlier versions is a common service for commercial redistributors to offer to their customers. This policy represents an explicit invitation to implement those changes in the core development tree in cases where they are likely to have a broad impact that helps improve the security of the internet as a whole, with the assurance that the existing core development team not only won't object to such contributions, but will actively encourage their incorporation into the next Python 2.7 maintenance release.
Documentation -------------
All modules covered by this policy MUST include a "Security Considerations" section in their documentation in order to take advantage of this policy.
In addition to any other module specific contents, this section SHOULD enumerate key security enhancements and fixes (with CVE identifiers where applicable), along with the feature and maintenance releases that first included them.
Security releases -----------------
This PEP does not propose any changes to the handling of security releases - those will continue to be source only releases that include only critical security fixes.
However, the recommendations for library and application developers are deliberately designed to accommodate commercial redistributors that choose to apply this policy to additional Python release series that are either in security fix only mode, or have been declared "end of life" by the core development team.
Whether or not redistributors choose to exercise that option will be up to the individual redistributor.
Integration testing -------------------
Third party integration testing services should offer users the ability to test against specific Python 2.7 maintenance releases, to ensure that libraries, frameworks and applications can still test their handling of the legacy security infrastructure correctly (either failing or degrading gracefully, depending on the security sensitivity of the software), even after the features covered in this policy have been backported to the Python 2.7 series.
Handling lower security environments with low risk tolerance ------------------------------------------------------------
For better or for worse (mostly worse), there are some environments where the risk of latent security defects is more tolerated than even a slightly increased risk of regressions in maintenance releases. This policy largely excludes these environments from consideration where the modules covered by the exemption are concerned - this approach is entirely inappropriate for software connected to the public internet, and defence in depth security principles suggest that it is not appropriate for most private networks either.
Downstream redistributors may still choose to cater to such environments, but they will need to handle the process of downgrading the security related modules and doing the associated regression testing themselves. The main CPython continuous integration infrastructure will not cover this scenario.
Evolution of this Policy ========================
The key requirement for a feature to be considered for inclusion in this policy is that it must have security implications *beyond* the specific application that is written in Python and the system that application is running on. Thus the focus on network security protocols, password storage and related cryptographic infrastructure - Python is a popular choice for the development of web services and clients, and thus the capabilities of widely used Python versions have implications for the security design of other services that may themselves be using newer versions of Python or other development languages, but need to interoperate with clients or servers written using older versions of Python.
The intent behind this requirement is to minimise any impact that the introduction of this policy may have on the stability and compatibility of maintenance releases. It would be thoroughly counterproductive if end users became as cautious about updating to new Python 2.7 maintenance releases as they are about updating to new feature releases within the same release series.
Motivation and Rationale ========================
The creation of this PEP was prompted primarily by the aging SSL support in the Python 2 series. As of March 2014, the Python 2.7 SSL module is approaching four years of age, and the SSL support in the still popular Python 2.6 release had its feature set locked six years ago.
These are simply too old to provide a foundation that can be recommended in good conscience for secure networking software that operates over the public internet, especially in an era where it is becoming quite clearly evident that advanced persistent security threats are even more widespread and more indiscriminate in their targeting than had previously been understood. While they represented reasonable security infrastructure in their time, the state of the art has moved on, and we need to investigate mechanisms for effectively providing more up to date network security infrastructure for users that, for whatever reason, are not currently in a position to migrate to Python 3.
While the use of the system OpenSSL installation addresses many of these concerns on Linux platforms, it doesn't address all of them (in particular, it is still difficult for sotware to explicitly require some higher level security settings). In the case of the binary installers for Windows and Mac OS X that are published on python.org, the version of OpenSSL used is entirely within the control of the Python core development team, but is currently limited to OpenSSL maintenance releases for the version initially shipped with the corresponding Python feature release.
With increased popularity comes increased responsibility, and this policy aims to acknowledge the fact that Python's popularity and adoption is at a sufficiently high level that some of our design and policy decisions have significant implications beyond the Python development community.
As one example, the Python 2 ``ssl`` module does not support the Server Name Identification standard. While it is possible to obtain SNI support by using the third party ``requests`` client library, actually doing so currently requires using not only ``requests`` and its embedded dependencies, but also half a dozen or more additional libraries. The lack of support in the Python 2 series thus serves as an impediment to making effective use of SNI on servers, as Python 2 clients will frequently fail to handle it correctly.
Another more critical example is the lack of SSL hostname matching in the Python 2 standard library - it is currently necessary to rely on a third party library, such as ``requests`` or ``backports.ssl_match_hostname`` to obtain that functionality in Python 2.
The Python 2 series also remains more vulnerable to remote timing attacks on security sensitive comparisons than the Python 3 series, as it lacks a standard library equivalent to the timing attack resistant ``hmac.compare_digest()`` function. While appropriate secure comparison functions can be implemented in third party extensions, many users don't even consider the issue and use ordinary equality comparisons instead - while a standard library solution doesn't automatically fix that problem, it *does* make the barrier to resolution much lower once the problem is pointed out.
My position on the ongoing transition from Python 2 to Python 3 has long been that Python 2 remains a supported platform for the core development team, and that commercial support will remain available well after upstream maintenance ends. However, in the absence of this network security enhancement policy, that position is difficult to justify when it comes to software that operates over the public internet. Just as many developers consider it too difficult to develop truly secure modern networked software in C/C++ (largely due to the challenges associated with manual memory management), I anticipate that in the not too distant future, it will be considered too difficult to develop truly secure modern networked software using the Python 2 series (some developers would argue that we have already reached that point).
Python 2.7 represents the only long term maintenance release the core development team has provided, and it is natural that there will be things that worked over a historically shorter maintenance lifespan that don't work over this longer support period. In the specific case of the problem described in this PEP, the simplest available solution is to acknowledge that long term maintenance of network security related modules *requires* the ability to add new features, even while retaining backwards compatibility for existing interfaces.
It is worth comparing the approach described in this PEP with Red Hat's handling of its long term support commitments: it isn't the RHEL 6.0 release itself that receives 10 years worth of support, but the overall RHEL 6 *series*. The individual RHEL 6.x point releases within the series then receive a wide variety of new features, including security enhancements, all while meeting strict backwards compatibility guarantees for existing software. The policy described in this PEP brings our approach to long term maintenance more into line with this precedent - we retain our strict backwards compatibility requirements, but slightly relax the restrictions against adding new features.
To date, downstream redistributors have respected our upstream policy of "no new features in Python maintenance releases". This PEP explicitly accepts that a more nuanced policy is appropriate in the case of network security related features, and the specific one it describes is deliberately designed such that it at least has some chance of being applied to Red Hat Enterprise Linux and its downstream derivatives.
Rejected alternative: just advise developers to migrate to Python 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------
This alternative represents the status quo. Unfortunately, it has proven to be unworkable in practice, as the backwards compatibility implications mean that this is a non-trivial migration process for large applications and integration projects. While the tools for migration have evolved to a point where it is possible to migrate even large applications opportunistically and incrementally (rather than all at once) by updating code to run in the large common subset of Python 2 and Python 3, using the most recent technology often isn't a priority in commercial environments.
Previously, this was considered an acceptable harm, as while it was an unfortunate problem for the affected developers to have to face, it was seen as an issue between them and their management chain to make the case for infrastructure modernisation, and this case would become naturally more compelling as the Python 3 series evolved.
However, now that we're fully aware of the impact the limitations of the Python 2 standard library may be having on the evolution of internet security standards, I no longer believe that it is reasonable to expect platform and application developers to resolve all of the latent defects in an application's Unicode correctness solely in order to gain access to the network security enhancements already available in Python 3.
While Ubuntu (and to some extent Debian as well) are committed to porting all default system services and scripts to Python 3, and to removing Python 2 from its default distribution images (but not from its archives), this is a mammoth task and won't be completed for the Ubuntu 14.04 LTS release (at least for the desktop image - it may be achieved for the mobile and server images).
Fedora has even more work to do to migrate, and it will take a non-trivial amount of time to migrate the relevant infrastructure components. While Red Hat are also actively working to make it easier for users to use more recent versions of Python on our stable platforms, it's going to take time for those efforts to start having an impact on end users' choice of version, and any such changes also don't benefit the core platform infrastructure that runs in the integrated system Python by necessity.
The OpenStack migration to Python 3 is also still in its infancy, and even though that's a project with an extensive and relatively robust automated test suite, it's still large enough that it is going to take quite some time to migrate fully to a Python 2/3 compatible code base.
And that's just three of the highest profile open source projects that make heavy use of Python. Given the likely existence of large amounts of legacy code that lacks the kind of automated regression test suite needed to help support a migration from Python 2 to Python 3, there are likely to be many cases where reimplementation (perhaps even in Python 3) proves easier than migration. The key point of this PEP is that those situations affect more people than just the developers and users of the affected application: the existence of clients and servers with outdated network security infrastructure becomes something that developers of secure networked services need to take into account as part of their security design, and that's a problem that inhibits the adoption of better security standards.
As Terry Reedy noted, if we try to persist with the status quo, the likely outcome is that commercial redistributors will attempt to do something like this on behalf of their customers *anyway*, but in a potentially inconsistent and ad hoc manner. By drawing the scope definition process into the upstream project we are in a better position to influence the approach taken to address the situation and to help ensure some consistency across redistributors.
The problem is real, so *something* needs to change, and this PEP describes my preferred approach to addressing the situation.
Rejected alternative: create and release Python 2.8 ---------------------------------------------------
With sufficient corporate support, it likely *would* be possible to create and release Python 2.8 (it's highly unlikely such a project would garner enough interest to be achievable with only volunteers). However, this wouldn't actually solve the problem, as the aim is to provide a *relatively low impact* way to incorporate enhanced security features into integrated products and deployments that make use of Python 2.
Upgrading to a new Python feature release would mean both more work for the core development team, as well as a more disruptive update that most potential end users would likely just skip entirely.
Attempting to create a Python 2.8 release would also bring in suggestions to backport many additional features from Python 3 (such as ``tracemalloc`` and the improved coroutine support), making the migration from Python 2.7 to this hypothetical 2.8 release even riskier and more disruptive.
This is not a recommended approach, as it would involve substantial additional work for a result that is actually less effective in achieving the original aim (which is to eliminate the current widespread use of the aging network security infrastructure in the Python 2 series).
Furthermore, while I can't make any commitments to actually addressing this issue on Red Hat platforms, I *can* categorically rule out the idea of a Python 2.8 being of any use to me in even attempting to get it addressed.
Rejected alternative: distribute the security enhancements via PyPI -------------------------------------------------------------------
While this initially appears to be an attractive and easier to manage approach, it actually suffers from several significant problems.
Firstly, this is complex, low level, cross-platform code that integrates with the underlying operating system across a variety of POSIX platforms (including Mac OS X) and Windows. The CPython BuildBot fleet is already set up to handle continuous integration in that context, but most of the freely available continuous integration services just offer Linux, and perhaps paid access to Windows. Those services work reasonably well for software that largely runs on the abstraction layers offered by Python and other dynamic languages, as well as the more comprehensive abstraction offered by the JVM, but won't suffice for the kind of code involved here.
The OpenSSL dependency for the network security support also qualifies as the kind of "complex binary dependency" that isn't yet handled well by the ``pip`` based software distribution ecosystem. Relying on a third party binary dependency also creates potential compatibility problems for ``pip`` when running on other interpreters like ``PyPy``.
Another practical problem with the idea is the fact that ``pip`` itself relies on the ``ssl`` support in the standard library (with some additional support from a bundled copy of ``requests``, which in turn bundles ``backport.ssl_match_hostname``), and hence would require any replacement module to also be bundled within ``pip``. This wouldn't pose any insurmountable difficulties (it's just another dependency to vendor), but it *would* mean yet another copy of OpenSSL to keep up to date.
This approach also has the same flaw as all other "improve security by renaming things" approaches: they completely miss the users who most need help, and raise significant barriers against being able to encourage users to do the right thing when their infrastructure supports it (since "use this other module" is a much higher impact change than "turn on this higher security setting"). Deprecating the aging SSL infrastructure in the standard library in favour of an external module would be even more user hostile than accepting the slightly increased risk of regressions associated with upgrading it in place.
Last, but certainly not least, this approach suffers from the same problem as the idea of doing a Python 2.8 release: likely not solving the actual problem. Commercial redistributors of Python are set up to redistribute *Python*, and a pre-existing set of additional packages. Getting new packages added to the pre-existing set *can* be done, but means approaching each and every redistributor and asking them to update their repackaging process accordingly. By contrast, the approach described in this PEP would require redistributors to deliberately *opt out* of the security enhancements by deliberately downgrading the provided network security infrastructure, which most of them are unlikely to do.
Rejected variant: provide a "legacy SSL infrastructure" branch --------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier versions of this PEP included the concept of a ``2.7-legacy-ssl`` branch that preserved the exact feature set of the Python 2.7.6 network security infrastructure.
It is the opinion of the PEP author that anyone that actually wants this is almost certainly making a mistake, and if they insist they really do want it in their specific situation, they're welcome to either make it themselves or arrange for a downstream redistributor to make it for them.
If they are made publicly available, any such rebuilds should be referred to as "Python 2.7 with Legacy SSL" to clearly distinguish them from the official Python 2.7 releases that include more up to date network security infrastructure.
After the first Python 2.7 maintenance release that has the security infrastructure updated to match Python 3.4, it would also be appropriate to refer to Python 2.7.6 and earlier releases as "Python 2.7 with Legacy SSL".
Rejected variant: synchronise particular modules entirely with Python 3 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier versions of this PEP suggested synchronising the ``hmac``, ``hashlib`` and ``ssl`` modules entirely with their Python 3 counterparts.
This approach proved too vague to build a compelling case for the exception, and has thus been replaced by the current more explicit proposal.
Open Questions ==============
* MvL has indicated he is not prepared to tackle the task of trying to integrate a newer OpenSSL into the also aging Python 2.7 build infrastructure on Windows (unfortunately, we've looked into upgrading that build infrastructure, and the backwards compatibility issues appear to be effectively insurmountable). We would require a commitment from another trusted contributor to handle at least this task, and potentially also taking over the task of creating the official Python 2.7 Windows installers for the remaining Python 2.7 maintenance releases.
* We would need commitments to create and review full backports of the components covered by this policy from Python 3.4 to Python 2.7, as well as support for handling any more specific security issues affecting these modules.
* Did I miss anything important in the switch to a more restrictive proposal?
Disclosure of Interest ======================
The author of this PEP currently works for Red Hat on test automation tools. If this proposal is accepted, I will be strongly encouraging Red Hat to take advantage of the resulting opportunity to help improve the overall security of the Python ecosystem. However, I do not speak for Red Hat in this matter, and cannot make any commitments on Red Hat's behalf.
Acknowledgements ================
Thanks to Christian Heimes and other for their efforts in greatly improving Python's SSL support in the Python 3 series, and a variety of members of the Python community for helping me to better understand the implications of the default settings we provide in our SSL modules, and the impact that tolerating the use of SSL infrastructure that was defined in 2010 (Python 2.7) or even 2008 (Python 2.6) potentially has for the security of the web as a whole.
Thanks to Donald Stufft and Alex Gaynor for identifying a more limited set of essential security features that allowed the proposal to be made more fine-grained than backporting entire modules from Python 3.4 [7,8]_.
Christian and Donald also provided valuable feedback on a preliminary draft of this proposal.
Thanks also to participants in the python-dev mailing list threads [1,2,5,6]_
References ==========
.. [1] PEP 466 discussion (round 1) (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133334.html)
.. [2] PEP 466 discussion (round 2) (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133389.html)
.. [3] Marc-Andre Lemburg's OpenSSL feedback for Windows (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133438.html)
.. [4] Ned Deily's OpenSSL feedback for Mac OS X (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133347.html)
.. [5] PEP 466 discussion (round 3) (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133442.html)
.. [6] PEP 466 discussion (round 4) (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133472.html)
.. [7] Donald Stufft's recommended set of backported features (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133500.html)
.. [8] Alex Gaynor's recommended set of backported features (https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2014-March/133503.html)
Copyright =========
This document has been placed in the public domain.
-- Nick Coghlan | ncoghlan@gmail.com | Brisbane, Australia _______________________________________________ Python-Dev mailing list Python-Dev@python.org https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-dev Unsubscribe: https://mail.python.org/mailman/options/python-dev/donald%40stufft.io
----------------- Donald Stufft PGP: 0x6E3CBCE93372DCFA // 7C6B 7C5D 5E2B 6356 A926 F04F 6E3C BCE9 3372 DCFA
On 26 March 2014 22:05, Donald Stufft <donald@stufft.io> wrote:
Typo I think:
As in the Python 3 series, the backported ssl.create_default_context() API is granted a backwards compatibility exemption that permits the protocol, options, cipher and other settings of the created SSL context to be made
made what?
Incomplete edit that I didn't notice until after posting. Fixed in the web version now, along with the copy & paste error in the list of hashlib attributes to be backported. The first two backwards compatibility paragraphs: ======================= As in the Python 3 series, the backported ssl.create_default_context() API is granted a backwards compatibility exemption that permits the protocol, options, cipher and other settings of the created SSL context to be updated in maintenance releases to use higher default security settings. This allows them to appropriately balance compatibility and security at the time of the maintenance release, rather than at the time of the original feature release. This PEP does not grant any other exemptions to the usual backwards compatibility policy for maintenance releases. Instead, by explicitly encouraging the use of feature based checks, it is designed to make it easier to write more secure cross-version compatible Python software, while still limiting the risk of breaking currently working software when upgrading to a new Python 2.7 maintenance release. ======================= Cheers, Nick. -- Nick Coghlan | ncoghlan@gmail.com | Brisbane, Australia
On Mar 26, 2014, at 8:00 AM, Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com> wrote:
Guido and Antoine persuaded me that selective backports would be a better idea for the network security enhancements than the wholesale module backports previously suggested, while Alex and Donald provided the necessary additional details, so here's a revised version of the PEP. Despite making it more explicit, I deleted more lines than I added, strongly suggesting that switching to selective backports was the right call :)
I dealt with the SSL module the way Donald suggested: excluding the RAND_* functions, rather than listing everything else.
I also changed the headings to make it clear the listed alternatives were rejected ideas, made the footnotes a bit more readable, and tidied up the wording in a few places.
Diff: http://hg.python.org/peps/rev/8527f6e2beb0 Web: http://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0466/
========================== PEP: 466 Title: Network Security Enhancement Exception for Python 2.7 Version: $Revision$ Last-Modified: $Date$ Author: Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com>, Status: Draft Type: Informational Content-Type: text/x-rst Created: 23-Mar-2014 Post-History: 23-Mar-2014, 24-Mar-2014, 25-Mar-2014, 26-Mar-2014
<snip>
This looks reasonable to me still and still solves the major problems that trying to securely use the 2.7 series has. +1 From me. ----------------- Donald Stufft PGP: 0x6E3CBCE93372DCFA // 7C6B 7C5D 5E2B 6356 A926 F04F 6E3C BCE9 3372 DCFA
Nick, On 26 March 2014 12:00, Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com> wrote:
As one example, the Python 2 ``ssl`` module does not support the Server Name Identification standard.
Tiny note: SNI is 'Server Name Indication', not 'Identification'. =) Otherwise, I'm +1 on this as well.
On 26 Mar 2014 23:12, "Cory Benfield" <cory@lukasa.co.uk> wrote:
Nick,
On 26 March 2014 12:00, Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com> wrote:
As one example, the Python 2 ``ssl`` module does not support the Server Name Identification standard.
Tiny note: SNI is 'Server Name Indication', not 'Identification'. =)
Hah, you know, I've never actually looked that up, because I assumed I knew what it stood for based on context :) Cheers, Nick.
On Mar 26, 2014, at 10:00 PM, Nick Coghlan wrote:
Guido and Antoine persuaded me that selective backports would be a better idea for the network security enhancements than the wholesale module backports previously suggested, while Alex and Donald provided the necessary additional details, so here's a revised version of the PEP. Despite making it more explicit, I deleted more lines than I added, strongly suggesting that switching to selective backports was the right call :)
Thanks. I think the narrower scope and details greatly improves this PEP and resolves most of the concerns I had about it. It maintains the backward compatibility pledge but relaxes the new feature backport prohibition where security concerns trump. Cheers, -Barry
On Wed Mar 26 2014 at 8:02:08 AM, Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com> wrote:
Guido and Antoine persuaded me that selective backports would be a better idea for the network security enhancements than the wholesale module backports previously suggested, while Alex and Donald provided the necessary additional details, so here's a revised version of the PEP. Despite making it more explicit, I deleted more lines than I added, strongly suggesting that switching to selective backports was the right call :)
I dealt with the SSL module the way Donald suggested: excluding the RAND_* functions, rather than listing everything else.
I also changed the headings to make it clear the listed alternatives were rejected ideas, made the footnotes a bit more readable, and tidied up the wording in a few places.
Diff: http://hg.python.org/peps/rev/8527f6e2beb0 Web: http://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0466/
========================== PEP: 466 Title: Network Security Enhancement Exception for Python 2.7 Version: $Revision$ Last-Modified: $Date$ Author: Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com>, Status: Draft Type: Informational Content-Type: text/x-rst Created: 23-Mar-2014 Post-History: 23-Mar-2014, 24-Mar-2014, 25-Mar-2014, 26-Mar-2014
[SNIP]
Exemption Policy ================
Under this policy, the following features SHOULD be backported from Python 3.4 to the upcoming Python 2.7.7 maintenance release:
* in the ``os`` module:
* persistent file descriptor for ``os.urandom()``.
* in the ``hmac`` module:
* constant time comparison function (``hmac.compare_digest()``).
* in the ``hashlib`` module:
* password hashing function (``hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac()``). * details of hash algorithm availability (``hashlib.algorithms_ guaranteed`` and ``hashlib.algorithms_guaranteed``).
You said algorithms_guaranteed twice. I assume that wasn't for emphasis. =) I'm +1 on this version of the PEP.
On 03/26/2014 05:00 AM, Nick Coghlan wrote:
The Mac OS X binary installers historically followed the same policy as other POSIX installations and dynamically linked to the Apple provided OpenSSL libraries. However, Apple has now ceased updating these cross-platform libraries, instead requiring that even cross-platform developers adopt Mac OS X specific interfaces to access up to date security infrastructure on their platform. Accordingly, and independently of this PEP, the Mac OS X binary installers were already going to be switched to statically linker newer versions of OpenSSL [4]_
Should be 'link', not 'linker'. Looks good. +1 -- ~Ethan~
This mostly looks good to me, however I'm not sure I understand the point of this sentence: "Rather, it is intended to send a clear signal to potential corporate contributors that the core development team are willing to accept offers of corporate assistance in putting this policy into effect [...]". It's fairly evident to me that the folks most likely to actually do the work of implementing this are myself and Donald. This PEP really has nothing to do with corporate contribution, so I think this sentence ought to be removed. Alex
On 27 Mar 2014 01:28, "Alex Gaynor" <alex.gaynor@gmail.com> wrote:
This mostly looks good to me, however I'm not sure I understand the point
of
this sentence: "Rather, it is intended to send a clear signal to potential corporate contributors that the core development team are willing to accept offers of corporate assistance in putting this policy into effect [...]". It's fairly evident to me that the folks most likely to actually do the work of implementing this are myself and Donald. This PEP really has nothing to do with corporate contribution, so I think this sentence ought to be removed.
Sure, I can reword that bit. I think I've made my point on that front by now, anyway, so preserving it in the web version isn't really necessary :) Cheers, Nick.
Alex
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participants (7)
-
Alex Gaynor -
Barry Warsaw -
Brett Cannon -
Cory Benfield -
Donald Stufft -
Ethan Furman -
Nick Coghlan