[Catalog-sig] Proposal: Move PyPI static data to the cloud for better availability

Tarek Ziadé ziade.tarek at gmail.com
Wed Jun 16 00:34:22 CEST 2010


On Tue, Jun 15, 2010 at 11:55 PM, Jesus Cea <jcea at jcea.es> wrote:
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> On 15/06/10 20:52, Tarek Ziadé wrote:
>> Do you trust the package you are installing more than an "official"
>> mirror ? if so, why ?
>
> If a package is signed by the author, I only need to "trust" the author.
>
> If a package is not signed in PYPI, I must "trust" the author, PYPI
> admins and pypi machines security.
>
> If I download from a mirror, with no digital signature, I must trust the
> author, PYPI admins, pypi machines security, mirror admins, mirror
> machine security and mirror replication protocol. And all network
> connections and harddisks in between.
>
> It is just me, call me paranoid, but I pay close attention to where the
> package being installed by "easy_install" is pulled from. I have
> documented where each package used to live and I check carefully when I
> see an unexpected URL. And I freak out when I package upgrade includes
> new dependencies I haven't seen before.

Makes sense.

>
>> Anyone can upload a package at PyPI with
>>
>>   os.system('rm -rf /')
>>
>> in its setup.py...
>
> True. And SCARY. Fortunatelly I only install packages I am interested
> in, check signatures, etc. Of course, I can be hacked if the original
> autor put a trojan in the package, or he/she was hacked before. But my
> exposure is smaller that if I must trust too every link in a LONG chain
> of mirrors.
>
> Just check his link, for a recent example:
>
> <http://it.slashdot.org/firehose.pl?op=view&type=story&sid=10/06/13/0046256>
>
> The trojan was not in the original sourcecode, but in an altered mirror
> version.
>
> Asking for pypi central node to add signatures is a trivial way of
> avoiding this issue. The question is not to trust or not to trust
> mirrors, but that we have technology to be safe even if the mirrors are
> not trusted. I don't NEED to trust you to be safe. I am happy!.

Sure, the ultimate solution are signatures, and I have forgotten that Martin
had work on this last year.

My opinion is just that until it's available and used, all PyPI
mirrors maintained by
people that are known members of the community are of a limited risk.


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