[Catalog-sig] Mandatory Reset of PyPI Passwords

Antoine Pitrou solipsis at pitrou.net
Wed Feb 13 21:09:33 CET 2013


Donald Stufft <donald.stufft <at> gmail.com> writes:
> 
> The midterm "at once" is still possible, it just bcrypt's the existing sha1
> passwords.
> This is better then unsalted sha1's but it's *worse* than just plain bcrypt. 

Why is it worse? SHA1 isn't terribly broken AFAIK.

> So yes for that week if the DB gets stolen we will be vulnerable
> to those passwords being bruteforced, but with an upcoming forced reset that 
> risk is
> pretty minimal and the risk of my custom bcrypt+sha1 code breaking in an edge 
> case
> is higher. 

Yeah, well, that's because you are forcing a full reset. I wouldn't call that
a "migration" since you are forcing users to re-enter new data.

Regards

Antoine.




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