[Catalog-sig] pre-PEP: transition to release-file hosting at pypi site

holger krekel holger at merlinux.eu
Tue Mar 12 18:22:26 CET 2013

On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 13:18 -0400, PJ Eby wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Jacob Kaplan-Moss <jacob at jacobian.org> wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 11:19 AM, M.-A. Lemburg <mal at egenix.com> wrote:
> >> So let's do this carefully and find a good solution before
> >> jumping to conclusions.
> >
> > Completely agreed; rushing is a bad idea.
> >
> > But so is not starting. What I'm seeing — as a total outsider, a user
> > of these tools, not someone who creates them — is that a bunch of
> > people (Holger, Donald, Richard, the pip maintainers, etc.) have the
> > beginnings of a solution ready to go *right now*, and I want to
> > capture that energy and enthusiasm before it evaporates.
> >
> > This isn't an academic situation; I've seen companies decline to adopt
> > Python over this exact security issue.
> Nobody told them about how to configure a restricted, site-wide
> default --allow-hosts setting?   (
> http://peak.telecommunity.com/DevCenter/EasyInstall#restricting-downloads-with-allow-hosts
> and http://docs.python.org/2/install/index.html#location-and-names-of-config-files
> )
> (FWIW, --allow-hosts was added in setuptools 0.6a6 -- *years* before
> the distribute fork or the existence of pip, and pip offers the same
> option.)
> I've already agreed to change setuptools to default this option to
> only allow downloads from the same host as its index URL, in a future
> release.  (i.e. to default --allow-hosts to the host of the
> --index-url option), and I support the removing of rel="" spidering
> from PyPI (which will significantly mitigate the immediate speed and
> security issues).  Heck, I've been the one who'se repeatedly proposed
> various ways of cutting back or removing rel="" attributes from the
> /simple index.
> The result of these two changes will actually have the same net effect
> that people are being asking for here: you'll only be able to download
> stuff hosted on PyPI, unless you explicitly override the --allow-hosts
> to get a wider range of packages.
> Already today, when a URL is blocked by --allow-hosts, it's announced
> as part of easy_install's output, so you can see exactly how much
> wider you need to extend your trust for the download to succeed.
> The *only* thing I object to is removing the ability for people to
> *choose* their own levels of trust.
> And I have not yet seen an argument that justifies removing people's
> ability to *choose* to be more inclusive in their downloads.
> And I've put multiple compromise proposals out there to begin
> mitigating the problem *now* (i.e. for non-updated versions of
> setuptools), and every time, the objection is, "no, we need to ban it
> all now, no discussion, no re-evaluation, no personal choice, everyone
> must do as we say, no argument".

FWIW, the PEP draft in V2 doesn't take this approach and i don't
plan to introduce it in subsequent versions. IOW, i agree that
we should keep things backward-compatible in the sense that users
can choose to use non-default settings to get the current behaviour 
(which might make their installation process less reliable/secure, 
but that's their choice).

> And I don't understand that, at all.

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