[IPython-dev] Some Thoughts on Notebook Security
ellisonbg at gmail.com
Tue Dec 11 00:27:59 EST 2012
But am I not correct that with the measures I proposed, that attack
vector is also rendered null? I don't want to have to tell people -
you have to run multiple domains when using the notebook. In many
cases, people ar running the notebook without any DNS whatsoever...
On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 9:22 PM, Bradley M. Froehle
<brad.froehle at gmail.com> wrote:
> Regardless of the approach taken, I think that Carl's suggestion of using separate domains for viewing & editing notebooks should be taken to heart. It does help eliminate one vector of attack.
> On Monday, December 10, 2012 at 8:12 PM, Brian Granger wrote:
>> I appreciate your thinking about this. It is really important. But I
>> think it *may* simple to fix:
>> There are two issues we have:
>> * In markdown cells users can put arbitrary HTML and JS.
>> To fix this, we need to enable the HTML sanitizer that comes with the
>> JS Markdown rendered that we are using. This is what StackOverflow
>> uses to sanitize their markdown and should completely remove any
>> security risks coming from within markdown cells.
>> into eval. This only happens when code is run, not when the notebook
>> is loaded, so it is less critical, but still needs to be fixed.
>> objects altogether.
>> Will these two things not completely fix the security problems we
>> currently have?
>> Now the question is how to enable all of the nice things you can do
>> and JSON handlers:
>> the person who runs the notebook server once and for all notebooks on
>> that server. Similar to how python packages are installed = you do
>> this before you start python. To get data from python to the
>> to handle them.
>> Unless I am misunderstanding the nature of the security risks, I think
>> this is what we should do.
>> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Carl Smith <carl.input at gmail.com (mailto:carl.input at gmail.com)> wrote:
>> > The IPython Notebook's vulnerability to cross-site scripting and
>> > cross-site request forgery, XSS and XSRF, is a serious problem that
>> > provides baddies with a range of attack vectors, each with almost
>> > unlimited potential for harm to the user. Attempting to find a single
>> > solution to so many problems is overwhelming and almost bound to fail.
>> > Therefore, we will likely benefit from breaking the problem down,
>> > insofar as we're able.
>> > The most obvious place to start is to distinguish between static views
>> > of a notebook and a notebook that has a running kernel, which I'll
>> > call static notebooks and kernelled notebooks for lack of a
>> > convention.
>> > A static notebook is just a webpage, so it should ideally behave like
>> > static notebooks have this ability is not a concern in itself.
>> > Serving all static notebooks from a separate domain should prevent XSS
>> > and XSRF attacks because of the Same Origin Policy.
>> > Static notebooks, served from a different domain, could be rendered
>> > inside iframes, enabling us to embed them inside other webpages and
>> > applications. These notebooks would still be superficially served by
>> > our own servers, so the UX wouldn't be effected.
>> > Using randomised URLs, or some other scheme that does not validate
>> > requests by stored credentials, may allow us to serve notebooks from
>> > the separate domain while keeping access to the notebooks private.
>> > This may be useful when users wish to share a static notebook
>> > selectively.
>> > removing it altogether. This seems like a bad idea as many static
>> > notebooks, particularly in the long run, will need to be able to use
>> > never-ending spiral.
>> > I think we need to build on browser security, and therefore trust it,
>> > rather than build a heap of nasty hacks, which may be circumvented
>> > anyway.
>> > Just taking it back to basics for a moment: If Malory signs up for a
>> > dating site, she might decide to put some dodgy JS inside some script
>> > tags, and submit that as part of her profile. If the site doesn't
>> > sanitise that HTML, we all know how it plays out; any poor chap that
>> > thinks she's a hotty gets pwned. Sanitising her input is textbook.
>> > Static notebooks are a totally different scenario. User's will want to
>> > include JS and have it work when publishing a static notebook. This is
>> > a feature of the Notebook. Furthermore, there's a number of ways to
>> > get JS into a static notebook, some more subtle than others, while a
>> > dating site is only dealing with text from an input field.
>> > I don't have much to say about kernelled notebooks right now, but on
>> > statics, I'd like to ask: If we serve a static notebook from a domain
>> > which has zero features beyond hosting static notebooks, would those
>> > notebooks be able to do anything to a user that a regular webpage
>> > couldn't? I'm not a security guy, so I really don't know, but it seems
>> > that we'd be totally free to let users publish whatever they liked,
>> > with no more restrictions than browsers impose already.
>> > I just don't want to see hours of work ploughed into crippling a super
>> > powerful feature, if we could just an use extra domain with a simple
>> > API instead.
>> > Carl
>> > _______________________________________________
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>> Brian E. Granger
>> Cal Poly State University, San Luis Obispo
>> bgranger at calpoly.edu (mailto:bgranger at calpoly.edu) and ellisonbg at gmail.com (mailto:ellisonbg at gmail.com)
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Brian E. Granger
Cal Poly State University, San Luis Obispo
bgranger at calpoly.edu and ellisonbg at gmail.com
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