[Patches] Patch to make tempfile return random filenames

[Andrew M. Kuchling]

Guido van Rossum writes:
>I have always assumed this is only really an issue with set-uid
>programs.  If I write a simple script, why would it be vulnerable?
>(There's still the PID in the name too.)

It matters if the script is run by the root user, not necessarily if
it's setuid.  I think one possible malicious attack is creating a
symlink to a file such as /etc/passwd; when the script runs, it opens
a temp. file, and overwrites /etc/passwd with junk.  Periodically you
see advisories from places like Red Hat, fixing these tempfile
problems an admin script that root runs

I think it's worth fixing, but I'm not clear on what the safe way to
create a temp. file *is*.  Has anyone written a clear guide to the
safe way to open tempfiles?

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