[Python-Dev] SK-CSIRT identified malicious software libraries in the official Python package repository, PyPI
victor.stinner at gmail.com
Fri Sep 15 17:08:00 EDT 2017
Benjamin Bach and Hanno Böck are running
https://www.pytosquatting.org/ and registered many projects lilke
"In June 2016, Typosquatting programming language package managers
stated that urllib2 had ~4,000 downloads in 2 weeks. The package name
is now squatted by us (the good guys). We take these findings
It seems like we need a solution to prevent that a project removed
because it contains malicious code, can be recreated automatically.
pytosquatting.org projects contain a download file: a tarball with a
setup.py file. This setup.py raises an exception, but also send a HTTP
request, a "pingback", to their server.
Thank you for reserving names of the standard library. But I'm not
sure of the HTTP "pingback" part. It can be on CIs, a restricted
Why not just reserving the name but don't provide any download file?
With no download file, the user will likely understand his/her error,
Note: I don't think that Benjamin Bach and Hanno Böck are related to
the PSRT nor PyPI administrators.
2017-09-15 22:28 GMT+02:00 Victor Stinner <victor.stinner at gmail.com>:
> Last week, the National Security Authority of Slovakia contacted the
> Python Security Response Team (PSRT) to report that the Python Package
> Index (PyPI) was hosting malicious packages. Installing these packages
> send user data to a HTTP server, but also install the expected module
> so it was an easy to notice the attack.
> Advisory: http://www.nbu.gov.sk/skcsirt-sa-20170909-pypi/
> Kudos to them to report the issue!
> It's not a compromise of the PyPI server nor a third-party project,
> but the "typo squatting" issue which is known since at least June 2016
> (for PyPI). The issue is not specific to Python, npmjs.com or
> rubygems.org are vulnerable to the same issue.
> For example, a malicious package used the names "urllib" (no 3) and
> "urlib3" (1 L) instead of "urllib3" (2 L). These packages were
> downloaded by users, so the attack was effective.
> More information on typo squatting and Python package security:
> The PRST contacted PyPI administrators and all identified packages
> were taken down, only 1h10 after the PSRT received the email from the
> National Security Authority of Slovakia!
> The typo squatting issue is known and discussed, but not solution was
> found yet. See for example this warehouse issue:
> It seems like the consensus is that pip is not responsible to detect
> malicious code, it's more the responsability of PyPI.
> The problem is to decide how to detect malicious code and/or prevent
> typo squatting on PyPI.
> The issue has been discussed privately on the PSRT list last week. The
> National Security Authority of Slovakia just published their advisory,
> and a public discussion started on reddit:
> I consider that it's now time to find a solution on the public
> python-dev mailing list.
> Let's try to find a solution!
> Can we learn something from the Update Framework (TUF)?
> with these security issues on their package manager?
> See also my other notes on Python security and the list of known
> CPython vulnerabilities:
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