Voting Project Needs Python People

Alan Dechert adechert at earthlink.net
Tue Jul 22 22:40:31 CEST 2003


"Harry George" <harry.g.george at boeing.com> wrote in message
news:xqxsmoyitto.fsf at cola2.ca.boeing.com...
>
> No, I said the paper and the CRT or LCD were correct.  It was just the
> electronic storage that was altered.
>
Okay, right.  My mistake.  I read #1 as one scenario and #2 as different
scenario.

Nonetheless, I maintain that such a game would be caught easily.  Checking a
very small sample before announcing the preliminary (electronic) count would
catch it.  If one percent of the electronic votes were altered (evenly
distributed), you will find one mismatch for sure after checking only a
dozen or two ballots.  If the one percent is not evenly distributed, it will
show up as very suspicious results in the areas where the alterations were
concentrated.  So, before announcing the electronic count, the result should
be given a common sense review.  For example, if Orange County in CA shows
75 % for the Democrat you know something's wrong (or San Francisco shows 75
% for the Republican).  Then samples should be checked in various locations
with any unexpected looking results getting special attention.

If you find one mismatch while sampling, you know there's a problem and the
tally would be delayed until all the paper ballots have been scanned.  Then
you do some manual checking of the results from scanning.

Then, you figure out how the rigging was carried out.  If the machines were
rigged all over, this would imply a very large conspiracy -- a very large
risk for a large number of people doing something that will be caught with
absolute certainty (thus very unlikely to happen).

Alan Dechert







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