[Python-ideas] Should our default random number generator be secure?

Alexander Walters tritium-list at sdamon.com
Thu Sep 10 05:51:42 CEST 2015

On 9/9/2015 22:11, Steven D'Aprano wrote:
> If the crypto PRNG were comparable in speed to what we have now (not
> significantly slower), or faster,*and*  gave reproducible results with
> the same seed,*and*  had no known/detectable statistical biases), and we
> could promise that those properties would continue to hold even when the
> state of the art changed and we got a new default crypto PRNG, then I'd
> still be -0.5 on the change due to the "false sense of security" factor.
+1 Exactly this.  If you can give me the same functionality (including 
seeding), make it faster *and* more secure, I have zero objections.  I 
*still* do not think we should go out of our way to make random a good 
source of cryptographic data, since...

Lets be frank about this, Guido is not a security expert.  I am not a 
security expert.  Tim, I suspect you are not a security expert. Lets 
leave actually attempting to be at the cutting edge of cryptographic 
randomness to modules by security experts.  I have far too much use for 
randomness outside of a cryptographic context to sacrifice the API and 
feature set we have for, in my opinion, a myopic focus on one, already 
discouraged, use of the random module.
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